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Equity Underwriting Relationships and Analyst Independence in Europe 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the accuracy of security analysts’ earnings forecasts and 
stock recommendations for firms in 13 European countries. We document at 
least three key findings. First, we find strong evidence that lead and co-lead 
underwriter analysts’ earnings estimates and stock recommendations are 
significantly more optimistic than those provided by unaffiliated analysts. 
Second, we find that lead and co-lead underwriter analysts’ earnings forecast 
and stock recommendations are significantly more optimistic for underwriter 
stocks than for those they provide for other stocks. Third, we also find 
evidence that these biases found within earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations are not driven by one particular country. In short, these 
findings suggest that affiliated analysts are more optimistic perhaps to 
maintain investment banking relations.  
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G12, G14 
 
Keywords:  analyst forecasts, stock recommendations, IPOs, underwriter  
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Equity Underwriting Relationships and Analyst Independence in Europe 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Analysts are employed by a range of firms such as investment banks and 
brokerage firms to provide objective and independent research information. 
This information can take the form of company specific reports, industry 
reports, company earnings forecasts, company growth prospects and issuing 
recommendations about whether to buy, sell or hold a particular stock. There 
is now a body of literature that shows that both professional and non-
professional investors react to management earning forecasts (Han and Tan, 
2007; Venkataraman et al., 2008). They are shown to influence analysts’ 
forecasts (Baginski and Hassel, 1990) and affect stock prices (Pownall et al., 
1993). Firms offering these services can be split into underwriters, firms that 
are involved in the floating of the initial public offering, and non-underwriters, 
firms that are not.  
 
These firms offer a range of financial services. They receive their income from 
activities such as corporate finance advice, on such issues as IPOs and 
merger advice, and brokerage services. A potential for conflict of interest 
arises because of underwriting relationships (Michaely and Womack, 1999; 
Bradshaw et al., 2003). Some analysts work for firms that underwrite and/or 
own the securities of the firms the analysts follow. Moreover, analysts may 
own stocks in the firms they follow. As a result, there may be pressure on the 
analyst to provide positive and optimistic assessments of a firm’s 
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performance.  In addition, it may be that the choice of underwriter is partly 
determined by the degree to which their analysts provide positive forecasts 
and stock recommendations (McNicols and O’Brien, 1997).  
 
Additional evidence suggests that analysts may not be as independent as 
expected and that the conflict of interests is a significant issue for the clients 
of firms that offer research. This has been identified in the US, particularly in 
relation to the dot com share collapse in the late 1990s. For example, 
Siconolfi (1992) reports that Morgan Stanley pressurised analysts to change 
negative research reports to more positive ones. Michaely and Womack 
(1999) surveyed investment professionals and found that the majority believed 
that a conflict of interest was present and that the pattern of recommendations 
given by the professionals was not independent and objective. Further, Hong 
and Kubik (2003) find that analyst optimism is and important determinant of 
career progression, particularly in relation to moving from a low status 
brokerage house to a high status house. Finally, in 2003, Elliott Spitzer 
reached a settlement with the ten largest securities firms following allegations 
of a conflict of interest between their investment banking considerations and 
their analysts’ research reports. The settlement was a tacit acceptance that 
the research undertaken by analysts employed by brokerage firms that had an 
investment bank was not independent. The consequence of the Spitzer 
settlement was that investment banks had to use independent analysts when 
undertaking analysis for their clients. This is an effective admission that 
independent analysts will produce less biased research than that produced by 
the analysts in the investment banks. 
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The importance of the conflict of interest as suggested by Spitzer may not be 
limited to a US environment in that many of these analysts work for 
international brokers. Thus a primary contribution of this paper is that to our 
knowledge there is no empirical research that examines the extent to which 
forecast error and stock recommendations by affiliated analysts differ from 
those of unaffiliated analysts within Europe. Different countries have different 
requirements in areas such as the level of financial disclosure, for example in 
relation to accounting practices, and the quality and quantity of data (Higgins, 
1998). He finds that analysts produced more accurate and less optimistic 
forecasts in countries that required more disclosure relative to countries that 
required less disclosure.  
 
However, disclosure is only one element of the much broader issue of the 
rights attached to the holders of equity and debt. These rights are determined 
by a country’s legal system. As La Porta et al. (1998) argue, legal systems 
can be separated into two broad categories, common law and civil law. They 
find that common law countries, for example, in the UK, have stronger legal 
protection for investors whereas civil law countries, for example Germany, 
have weaker protection. The legal environment holds an essential position 
with respect to a firm’s corporate governance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
argue that legal protection systems are fundamental if outside investors are to 
have confidence in a firm’s financial reporting. Moreover, Skinner (1994) 
asserts that the level of corporate legal liability to shareholders can influence 
disclosure. For example, shareholders may pursue legal action against 
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corporations if negative earnings surprises trigger large stock price declines. 
Thus, to reduce potential legal liability corporations are motivated to 
voluntarily disclose information, whether good or bad. This will normally result 
in a more accurate stock price.  
 
However, this framework depends on a properly functioning legal system that 
is designed to protect shareholders. If a legal system offers less protection to 
shareholders, management may have less incentive to disclose bad 
information. Rogers and Buskirk (2008) suggest that the litigation process 
may encourage firms to reduce the provision of disclosures for which they 
may later be held accountable. Consistent with La Porta et al. (1998), this 
indicates that a civil law system will produce more optimistic forecasts as bad 
news may not be disclosed. In contrast, forecasts under common law systems 
should include good and bad news resulting in less optimistic forecasts. Thus 
given that US and UK law have similar common law foundations, UK results 
should be similar to US evidence but forecasts should be less optimistic than 
those for other European countries. Therefore a second contribution of the 
paper is to assess the impact that different legal systems have on the degree 
of optimism and pessimism of analysts’ forecasts. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the relevant 
literature and sets out the hypotheses. Section three describes the sample 
and data definitions. Section four presents the results and finally, some 
conclusions are drawn. 
 
 9 
II. Prior Research 
The literature dealing with the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts may be 
separated into two main categories, studies dealing with forecasts that do not 
directly address the independence of analysts and, more recently, studies that 
do.  
 
In the first category are a number of studies that do not deal with 
independence. For example, O’Brien (1990) and Butler and Lang (1991) 
investigated the forecasts of individual analysts and found no evidence of 
differences in the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. Brown (2001) finds that an 
individual analyst’s forecast error is correlated with the error in the previous 
period. Chan et al. (2004) find that analysts’ forecast accuracy is consistent 
over time, a finding that applied to both the most and least accurate analysts.  
 
Most of the studies in this category, however, deal implicitly with analyst 
independence. Their common thread is that they link forecasts either to gain 
the confidence of the management of the firm whose earnings are being 
forecast or to improve their job prospects.  The former is important for a 
number of reasons. First, it may give access to private information which can 
only be gained by close contact with the forecasts firm’s management. 
Second, the reputation for accurate forecasts may generate more investment 
business for the forecaster’s firm and so good relations with management has 
potential income-generating consequences. Francis and Philbrick (1993) find 
that firms often produce an optimistic forecast after making a sell 
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recommendation, something clearly aimed at trying to build a more positive 
relationship with the firm.  
 
Olsen (1996) argues that the optimism of analyst forecasts is caused by 
analyst herding. Chopra (1998) reports that analysts forecasts tend to be 
overly optimistic but that the over-optimism declines during the year. They 
also note that over the period 1993-1998, forecasts became more accurate. 
Das et al. (1998) illustrate the importance of private information by showing 
that analysts focus on accuracy rather than bias in order to gain access to 
managers. Lim (2001) identifies bias amongst analysts who work for smaller 
firms and who are less experienced. These characteristics make it harder for 
these analysts to gain access to private information. Bias becomes a means 
to gain such information as a reward for the positive signals sent by the 
forecasts.  Interestingly, Krigman et al. (2001) find that the reason managers 
switch underwriters is to move to a more prestigious underwriter and to 
increase analyst coverage. 
 
Hong and Kubik (2003) report that analysts are rewarded for the accuracy of 
their forecasts.  They find that accurate forecasters are more likely to move up 
the hierarchy of analyst firms and poorer forecasters are more likely to move 
down. Career progression is therefore influenced by forecast accuracy.  
  
The second strand of literature deals explicitly with the issue of analyst 
independence. Clayman and Schwartz (1994) argue that the need to maintain 
access to management makes it more difficult for analysts to make 
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pessimistic forecasts about a firm. This is exacerbated when the analysts 
work for investment banks. Dugar and Nathan (1995) found that analysts were 
more optimistic if there had been a long term investment bank-client 
relationship relative to analysts’ forecasts where there was no investment 
banking link. Differentiating between affiliated analysts, those employed by 
investment banks that were either the lead underwriter or the co-underwriter 
of a seasoned equity issue, and non-affiliated underwriters, Lin and McNichols 
(1998) found no evidence of a conflict of interest in relation to earnings 
forecasts. However, they found that affiliated analysts produced more 
favourable growth forecasts suggesting a difference in the attitude towards 
independence depending on the type of forecast being made. In terms of 
analyst recommendations, Michaely and Womack (1999) also find evidence of 
a conflict of interest. They find that underwriter analysts’ buy 
recommendations perform worse than buy recommendation of non-affiliated 
analysts. 
 
Boni and Womack (2002) surveyed analysts and found a general scepticism 
about the ability to undertake truly independent research, a finding which 
raises interesting questions about the perspectives of analysts. Hong and 
Kubick (2003) find some evidence of a conflict of interest because analysts 
covering underwritten stocks tended to be judged less on their accuracy than 
on their optimism. They also found that analyst rewards were driven more by 
optimism than accuracy during the stock market boom of the late 1990s. 
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Chan et al. (2003) analysed earnings surprises and found that analysts 
forecasts are influenced by desire to win investment banking clients, 
particularly those clients defined as growth firms. They were more likely to 
experience non-negative surprises than value firms. Growth firms are more 
likely to raise new capital or be involved in acquisitions and so are potential 
sources of lucrative new business for investment banking firms. Where the 
firm does less well than the forecast, avoiding negative surprises pressurises 
the analyst into making conservative forecasts. A similar finding was reported 
by Cowan et al. (2003) who found that investment bank analysts were less 
optimistic than analysts from brokerage firms that were not underwriters. The 
lack of optimism could reflect a conflict of interest because lower forecasts are 
easier to achieve and so imply better firm performance.  
 
Jacob et al. (2003) differentiate between independent forecasters, non-
independent forecasters, and investment banks. They find that the forecasts 
of analysts at investment banks are more accurate and less optimistic than 
the forecasts of independent analysts. One reason for the poorer independent 
analysts’ forecasts could be that these firms tend to be smaller and so may be 
less able to attract the best analysts. For example, they may be unable to 
match the salaries offered by the larger investment banks. It is also probable 
the independent researchers will have less access to valuable in formation 
and so will be less able to provide as accurate forecasts.  
 
Clarke et al. (2004) split analysts into those at investment banks, pure 
brokerages and independent research firms. They find no evidence of a 
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conflict of interest and indeed show that analysts in large investment banks 
produce more accurate earnings forecasts than analysts at either small 
investment banks or large independent firms. They also find that moving to a 
larger firm has no impact on the degree of optimism shown by the analyst at 
the previous firm. The important conclusion to be drawn from this study is that 
independent analysts do not offer better and more unbiased forecasts.  
 
The literature shows that the US evidence is mixed. However, the balance of 
the evidence suggests that a conflict of interest does occur between analysts 
and a client, or potential client. This potential conflict will be analysed within a 
European context.  
 
III. Methodology 
We gather data from two large data sources: I/B/E/S and SDC on 13 
European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 
The Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) reports earnings forecasts 
and stock recommendations for equity analysts. The Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) provides data on equity offerings, in particular, IPOs and 
Follow-ons. SDC also provides information on lead and co-lead underwriters 
of the IPOs and Follow-ons from which we determine analysts affiliation. The 
time period of our analysis is January 1988 to June 2005 for earnings 
estimates and January 1994 to June 2005 for analyst recommendations. 
I/B/E/S began the reporting of analyst recommendations for European firms in 
January 1994.  
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With respect to investment banking conflicts, we classify analysts within two 
activity groups: sell-side and independent. If an analyst offers earnings 
estimates and/or recommendations for a firm where their employer was a lead 
or co-lead underwriter, they are labelled as a sell-side analyst. On the other 
hand, if an analyst provides earnings estimates and/or recommendations for a 
firm where their employer was not a lead or co-lead underwriter, they are 
labelled as independent. Please note that our measure of independence 
implies free from any conflict of interest resulting from an affiliation with a lead 
or co-lead underwriter.  
 
We examine the effect of analyst independence on forecast error and stock 
recommendations. The most commonly used measure of forecast accuracy is 
forecast error, which measures the difference between forecast earnings and 
actual firm earnings.  Following Hong and Kubik (2003), we scale our 
measure of forecast error by the price of the stock at the time of an earnings 
announcement.  
 
Forecast Error =  (Fijt – Ajt )/ Pt  
jtjtjitji PAFFE /)( ,,,,,   
where tjiFE ,,  is the forecast error of a analyst i for firm j at time t. tjiF ,,  is 
analyst i’s  forecast EPS for firm j at time t. tjA ,  is firm j’s actual EPS at time t 
and jP  is firm j’s  share price. The bias shows the extent to which forecasts 
are optimistic or pessimistic. A positive error illustrates optimism and a 
negative one shows pessimism. 
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Analyst stock recommendations, these are based on a five point scale: 1 = 
strong buy, 2 = buy, 3 = hold, 4 = sell, and 5 = strong sell. More positive 
recommendations are therefore associated with low mean values and the 
more pessimistic the recommendations, the higher the mean values.  
 
We merge the I/B/E/S and SDC databases by three matching variables: 
underwriter name, company name, and date. Since these matching variables 
are not exact, we use programming syntax to create synthetic variables for 
merging the two databases. 
 
The sample is split into four legal systems, English law, French law, German 
law and Scandinavian law (La Porta et al., 1998). We use the La Porta 
categories; English origin  common law – UK; French origin civil law – France, 
Belgium, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands; German origin civil law – Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland; Scandinavian origin civil law – Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden. The UK system offers the highest levels of protection 
and the French system the weakest protection with the German and 
Scandinavian between them and the UK system (La Porta et al., 1998). 
 
IV. Results 
Insert Table I 
The sample’s descriptive statistics are given in Table I. In Panel A, we present 
analyst-employer information. For underwriters and non-underwriters, the 
figures show an increase in the number of analysts and the number of firms 
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during the 1990s. The number of underwriting and non-underwriting firms 
peak in 2000 but the number of analysts increases until 2002. The number of 
estimates increases until 2004 which suggests increasing analysts’ 
productivity. Table 1 shows that non-underwriting firms employ more analysts 
and are greater in number. They also employ more analysts and produce 
more estimates.  
 
Panel B reports the analysts’ mean characteristics. With the exception of 
2005, underwriting firms increased their mean number of analysts in each of 
the years. By 2004, there had been a 4.8-fold increase in the mean number of 
analysts employed by underwriters, from 2.45 to 11.80. The mean estimates 
per analyst shows that there was a fall in the output of underwriter analysts 
from 1990 until 1995. The number fell from 3.92 to 3.54. However since then 
the figure has risen to 8.06 with underwriter analysts now being as productive 
as they were in the early 1990s. Therefore over the period, there was a 105% 
increase in the mean number of estimates by each analyst. 
 
There has been an increase over the period in the number of mean estimates 
per analyst per firm, from 2.09 to 5.79. However, the figure had fallen between 
1990 and 1995 but has since risen and by the end of the period analysts had 
increased their estimates by 2.77 fold. In terms of analyst coverage, there has 
been a general decline in the number of firms followed by underwriter 
analysts. The mean number has fallen from 1.90 to 1.22 showing that they 
cover, on average, 64% of the number of firms covered in 1988. The decline 
in the number of firms implies that more time can be spent analysing fewer 
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firms. It may therefore be expected that the underwriter forecasts would 
become more accurate. 
 
Non-underwriting firms illustrate similar characteristics. They also experienced 
a 4-fold increase in the mean number of analysts per firm from 8.10 in 1988 to 
35.81 2004. The number of mean estimates per analyst increased from 8.76 
to 15.12, a 172% increase, slightly lower than the underwriters’ figure. The 
number of estimates per analyst per firm increased from 3.07 to 5.59, a 1.82 
fold increase, the increase being higher than for underwriter analysts. Non-
underwriter firms also experienced a reduction in the mean number of firms 
covered by each analyst, but the decline was smaller than for underwriter 
firms. 
 
Panel C gives details of analyst characteristics by country. We find that the 
countries with the largest number of firms are Germany, France and the UK, 
each with over one hundred firms. The countries with the most distinct 
underwriters are Germany, France and the Netherlands. The countries with 
the highest number of analysts are France, Germany and the UK. The 
countries producing the most total estimates are France, Germany and the 
UK. Firms in the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland have the largest number 
of analysts per firm. The lowest mean forecast errors are found in the 
Netherlands, Italy and the UK. The most optimistic forecasts are produced by 
analysts in Spain, Belgium and Norway. This may be explained through the 
legal systems which will be discussed later.  
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Panel D breaks the underwriters and non-underwriters recommendations 
down by recommendation class. We expect that if underwriters were providing 
independently determined recommendations, there would be no difference 
between the various recommendation classes. However, we find that 
underwriters provide more buy and strong buy recommendations than 
independent analysts. For underwriters, 23.7% of their recommendations 
were ‘strong buy’ and 30.3% were ‘buy’. In contrast, non-underwriters had 
21.1% ‘strong buy’ recommendations and 29.4% ‘buy’ recommendations. 
Combining the two categories, shows that underwriters had 53.7% of their 
forecasts as at least ‘buy’ whereas for non-underwriters, the figure is 50.5%, 
3.2% points lower. 
 
Although there is no difference in the percentage of ‘hold’ recommendations, 
both have 33.1% in that category, non-underwriters produce more ‘sell’ 
recommendation, In particular their ‘strong sell’ is 5.4% against 2.5%. Overall, 
the results therefore indicate that underwriters are more optimistic in their 
recommendations are less likely to issue ‘sell’ recommendations for stock they 
have underwritten. 
Insert Table II 
Table II develops the analysis by presenting evidence about analysts’ 
recommendations by year, panel A, and by country, Panel B. Panel A shows a 
clear reduction in the percentage of strong buy recommendations, from 36.2% 
of total recommendations in 1994 to only 15.2% in 2005. The percentage fell 
each year. The percentage buy figure shows an almost complete reversal with 
the figure rising from 13.4% in 1994 to 32.6% in 2005. This suggests that 
 19 
analysts were becoming less optimistic in their recommendations and were 
opting for a less risky strategy of buy rather than strong buy. The relationship 
cannot be explained by the market slowdown in the late 1990s because it did 
not affect the upward trend for buy recommendations and the downward 
movement in strong buy recommendations. 
 
Hold recommendations fall slightly from 38.6% in 1994 to 32.6% in 2005 
which further indicates a slight reduction in confidence in the stocks. This is 
also shown by the sell recommendations where an increase occurs from 4.3% 
in 1995 to 13.9% in 2005. However, strong sells become less common, falling 
from 7.6% to 4.8%. If we combine the buy and sell recommendations, we find 
a fall in buy recommendations from 49.6% to 47.8% and a rise in sell 
recommendations from 11.95 to 18.7%. Therefore, Panel A shows clear 
evidence that analysts were becoming less optimistic, or more cautious, in 
their recommendations during the period under analysis.  
 
 Panel B breaks down the recommendations by country. Seven of the thirteen 
countries has strong buy recommendations of less than 20% and six had 
greater. The country with the highest percentage is France with 26.7% and 
the lowest is Finland with 16.1%. The Scandinavian countries, as a group, 
have the least strong buy recommendations. The country with the highest buy 
recommendations is Italy, 34.2% followed by France and Finland. The lowest 
figures are found in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
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There is also a large spread in the hold recommendations ranging from 29.8% 
in Spain to 45.4% in Belgium. The Netherlands is the only other country with a 
figure in excess of 40%. The Scandinavian countries tend to produce the 
highest percentage of sell recommendations, the highest being Sweden with 
16.0%. The highest strong sell figure is reported for Germany, 8.0%.  
 
The country with the highest combined percentage of buy recommendations is 
France, 60.2%, and highest combined sell recommendations is Sweden, 
21.1%. One explanation for the differences is analysed later in the paper by 
La Porta et al. (1998) where the categorisation of countries into types of legal 
system is investigated. 
Insert table III 
Two sets of results are reported in Table III. First, it compares the underwriting 
analyst mean forecast error (FE) to the mean FE for all other analysts 
following the underwriter stocks. Second, it compares the mean analysts’ 
recommendations to the mean recommendation for all other analysts following 
the same underwriter stocks.   
 
Clayman and Schwartz (1994) find that optimism is an important 
consideration, particularly when gaining, or maintaining, access to 
management is important. Hong and Kubik (2003) also found that optimism 
was regarded as important. We therefore expect that underwriters will be 
more optimistic in their forecasts and recommendations than non-underwriter 
analysts.  
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In terms of forecast error, we find that the mean underwriter forecast error is 
significantly higher than the error for other analysts following the same stocks, 
0.1513 and 0.1438 respectively. The difference is significant at the 10% level. 
This indicates that the underwriters were more optimistic than the other 
analysts that followed the underwriters’ stocks. We also find that, for 
underwriters involved in the IPO, their mean forecast error is significantly 
higher than the mean error for other analysts following the same stocks, 
0.2067 and 0.1438. The difference is significant at the 1% level. However, we 
find that follow-on underwriters have significantly lower forecast errors than 
other analysts, 0.1293 and 0.1438 respectively, the result being significant at 
1%. This implies that these underwriters are less optimistic in their forecasts. 
However, this may not be a negative phenomenon. It may be that access to 
better information results in a more accurate forecast by the follow-on 
analysts. In addition they may also not wish to lay the management of these 
firms open to the perception that they are underperforming, hence they may 
be producing more conservative forecasts  
 
We also find evidence that there are differences in the strength of the 
recommendations given by the different analysts. Analysts involved as 
underwriters issued significantly more positive recommendations than other 
analysts. Their mean recommendation was 2.3812 whereas for other analysts 
it was 2.5099. The difference is significant at the 1% level. We also find the 
IPO underwriters issued stronger buy recommendations than other analysts, 
2.3487 against 2.5099. The difference is again significant at the 1% level. 
There is also a significant difference in the recommendations of follow-on 
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underwriters relative to other analysts. The respective means are 2.3948 and 
2.5099 respectively, with the difference significant at the 1% level. Therefore, 
follow-on analysts produce the lowest mean forecast errors and the strongest 
buy recommendations. A plausible explanation is that these are listed firms 
and as a result performance track records will have been established. 
Analysts are therefore better able to predict earnings as opposed newly listed 
IPO’s where track records are less transparent.  
 
The results in Table III show that underwriters are more optimistic in their 
forecasts relative to non-underwriter analysts following the same stocks. 
However, we find that this is being driven by IPO underwriters because they 
are significantly more optimistic whereas follow-on underwriters have 
significantly lower forecast error than other analysts. In terms of stock 
recommendations, we find that all underwriter classifications recommend 
significantly stronger buy recommendations than other analysts. This holds for 
all underwriters as well as for IPO and follow-on underwriters. 
 
Insert Table IV  
The analysis is developed by analysing the performance of the underwriters in 
terms of the stocks they underwrote relative to their performance on stocks 
they did not underwrite. If we predict that underwriters are independent 
(REFS), we would expect no differences in the analyst’s performance 
between the two types of stocks. Table III compares the underwriting analysts 
forecast error (FE) to the FE of all other stocks the underwriting analyst 
follows. It also compares the underwriting analysts mean recommendation to 
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the mean analyst recommendation for all other stocks the underwriter analyst 
follows. It therefore assesses the extent to which underwriter analysts are 
optimistic when dealing with firms that generate underwriter fees relative to 
firms that do not generate such additional income. 
 
We find that forecasts for underwritten stocks are significantly more optimistic 
than forecasts for non-underwritten stocks. The average forecast errors for 
underwritten and non-underwritten stocks are 0.1513 and 0.1196 respectively, 
with the difference being significant at the 1% level. We also find higher mean 
forecast errors when the underwriting involves an IPO, the average forecast 
error being 0.2067 against 0.1196 for other stocks. Follow-on mean forecast 
errors are also higher than the forecasts for other stocks, with the average 
error being 0.1293 and 0.1196 respectively. The former is significant at the1% 
level and the latter at the 5% level.  
 
The results show that underwritten stocks are characterised by greater 
optimism and that other stocks followed by the same analyst are 
characterised by greater accuracy. This is counter to Cowan et al. (2003) and 
Chen et al. (2003) who argue that underwriters try to avoid negative surprises 
by publishing lower forecasts that are easier to achieve by management. This 
would be consistent with a strategy of presenting a positive picture of the 
performance of underwritten stocks. This finding offers support for the 
strategic reporting bias model of Duggan and Nathan (1995).  
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As far as stock recommendations are concerned, underwritten stocks receive 
more optimistic buy recommendations than other stocks dealt with by the 
same underwriter. The mean recommendation is 2.3813 for underwritten 
stocks and 2.5236 for non-underwritten stocks. There are similar significant 
differences with IPO and follow-on stocks relative to non-underwritten stocks. 
All differences are significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table IV therefore shows that the forecasts made by underwriter analysts are 
more optimistic than the forecasts they make for non-underwritten stocks. The 
recommendations are also stronger. These results therefore indicate bias in 
relation to underwritten stocks. 
 
Insert table V 
 
The next part of the analysis looks at the effect of legal setting on 
underwriters’ forecasts and recommendations. Table V separates the sample 
by legal system, English law, French law, German law and Scandinavian law. 
If the common law system offers greater incentives for underwriters to 
produce less optimistic forecasts, we would expect that the English law 
forecasts would have smaller average errors than the other legal systems. We 
also expect the weakest system to produce the highest errors. The results 
support this view. The English common law legal system does produce the 
lowest average forecast errors, 7.48%, the French system has the largest 
errors, 15.58% with the other two in between, 10.10% for the German system 
and 12.63% for the Scandinavian system. As the third column shows, the 
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differences are statistically significant at the 1% level for all alternative legal 
systems. The results therefore show that a common law legal framework is 
associated with less optimistic forecasts. 
 
We then investigated the extent to which the type of legal system influenced 
underwriter recommendations. Given the greater rights under common law, 
we would expect underwriters, with their better access to information, to 
provide more accurate and less optimistic forecasts and recommendations 
than non-underwriters following an IPO.  
 
Insert Table VI 
 
Table VI presents the results for analysts forecast errors and 
recommendations by country. It presents two sets of results. First, it shows 
the mean forecast error of underwriters and other analysts’ forecasts by 
country. Second, it compares the underwriting analyst mean forecast error 
(FE) to the mean FE for all other analysts following the same IPO stocks by 
country. Third, it compares the mean analyst’s recommendation to the mean 
recommendation for all other analysts following the same IPO stocks by 
country.  
 
In terms of the optimism hypothesis, we find no evidence that underwriters 
under a common law system produce less optimistic forecasts. Five countries 
produce underwriter error of under 10%, Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Finland and the UK. They cover all legal systems except the German-origin. 
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The most optimistic forecasts, in general, are produced the French and 
German legal systems with the most optimistic forecasts being produced in 
Spain, Germany, Norway and Austria.  
 
There is mixed evidence in terms of underwriter optimism. We find no 
significant difference between the analyst forecast errors for IPO underwriters 
and the forecast errors of other analysts for three countries, Belgium, Spain 
and Denmark. However, all other countries all experienced significant 
differences. Of these, two countries, Finland and Sweden, had significantly 
lower underwriter IPO forecast errors illustrating that IPO underwriters 
produced less optimistic forecasts than other underwriters. The other eight 
countries all had significantly higher underwriter IPO analyst forecast errors. 
Again, all errors were positive indicating an optimistic view of performance. 
Thus the Scandinavian-origin law produced significantly less optimistic 
underwriter forecasts, with Sweden being the least optimistic.  However, there 
is one exception to this, Norway has very high forecast errors suggesting that 
their system has its own specific characteristics. 
 
Table VI shows that the UK produces the most positive recommendations with 
an average of 1.60. The Scandinavian system produces the least strong buy 
recommendations with the French and German systems producing mixed 
results.  
 
In relation to the extent to which IPO underwriters are more optimistic in their 
recommendations, three countries, Finland, Norway and Sweden, had no 
 27 
significant differences in the recommendations made by IPO analysts and 
other analysts. Two countries, Italy and Switzerland, had significantly weaker 
buy recommendations made by IPO analysts. The other eight countries all 
had significantly stronger buy recommendations given by IPO analysts.  
 
Overall, the results show country specific differences in the extent of 
underwriter optimism and stock recommendations. The differences between 
legal system types is less clear-cut but in general terms, it appears that the 
English-origin system produces a more accurate, less optimistic set of 
underwriter forecasts and recommendations than the other systems. There is 
therefore some evidence to support La Porta et al. (1998) and Higgins (1998) 
arguments of the importance of legal system types as a determinant of 
forecaster optimism. 
Insert Table VII 
 
Table VII presents two sets of results for each country. First, it compares the 
underwriting analysts forecast error (FE) to the FE of all other IPO stocks the 
underwriting analyst follows. Second, it compares the underwriting analysts’ 
mean recommendations to the mean analyst recommendations for all other 
IPO stocks the underwriter analyst follows. 
 
As columns two and three show, we find evidence that analysts involved in 
IPOs are statistically more optimistic in their forecasts relative to their 
forecasts of non-underwritten stocks. This holds for eight countries. Two have 
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statistically less optimistic forecasts, Finland and Sweden, and three countries 
have insignificant differences, Belgium, the UK and Denmark.  
  
Table VII also shows, columns 5 and 6, that in the majority of countries, 
analysts make stronger buy recommendations on stocks they have 
underwritten and less strong buy recommendations on non-underwritten 
stocks. Statistical differences were found for eight of the countries. In one 
case, Italy, statistically stronger buy recommendations were made on non-IPO 
stocks. The other four countries, Spain, Switzerland, Finland and Norway, had 
no differences in the recommendations.    
 
V. Conclusions 
The paper has examined the accuracy of security analysts’ earnings forecasts 
and stock recommendations for firms in 13 European countries. We report 
three key findings. First, there is strong evidence that lead and co-lead 
underwriter analysts’ earnings estimates and stock recommendations are 
significantly more optimistic than those of unaffiliated analysts. Second, we 
find that lead and co-lead underwriter analysts’ earnings forecast and stock 
recommendations are significantly more optimistic for underwriter stocks than 
for those they provide for other stocks. Third, we also find evidence that these 
differences are not driven by one particular country but find that the legal 
system is an important factor. Overall, our findings indicate that affiliated 
analysts are more optimistic than unaffiliated analysts which would be 
consistent with maintaining good investment banking relations. 
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics – Analyst – Employer Characteristics 
 
Table I reports descriptive statistics on employer and analysts characteristics, earnings 
forecasts, and recommendations for the period January 1988 through May 2005 for all I/B/E/S 
reported firms within 13 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom).  
Panel A provides information on the number of analyst-employer characteristics; Panel B 
provides information on analyst mean characteristics; Panel C provides information on analyst 
characteristics by country.   
 
Panel A: Analyst – Employer Characteristics  
 Underwriters Other 
 
 
Year 
Distinct 
Employers - 
Underwriters 
 
Distinct 
Analysts 
 
 
Estimates
 
No. 
of 
Firms
Distinct 
Employers 
- 
Other 
 
Distinct 
Analysts 
 
 
Estimates 
 
No. 
of 
Firms
         
1988 20 39 142 59 67 270 2,051 226
1989 25 62 306 74 98 385 4,254 255
1990 30 75 507 97 125 518 6,168 266
1991 37 110 710 119 144 756 8,852 318
1992 50 147 871 135 170 911 11,544 347
1993 56 173 1,216 145 198 1,238 16,044 340
1994 44 160 866 114 202 1,239 9,654 319
1995 42 185 623 130 208 1,509 7,862 432
1996 57 307 1,097 184 219 2,358 15,303 483
1997 65 416 1,804 241 229 3,115 22,502 578
1998 69 456 2,152 264 238 3,472 27,624 638
1999 73 538 2,528 319 243 3,770 31,760 743
2000 78 617 2,995 366 231 4,125 37,823 787
2001 76 676 3,464 377 207 4,341 39,555 749
2002 69 686 3,921 362 181 4,537 44,028 689
2003 62 640 4,045 315 161 4,497 45,938 621
2004 55 643 4,151 290 135 4,314 49,733 539
2005 50 490 3,320 223 132 3,704 40,459 401
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Panel B: Analysts Characteristics 
 Underwriters Other 
 
 
Year 
 
Mean  
Analysts  
per 
Employer 
 
Mean 
Estimates  
per 
Analyst 
Mean 
Estimates
per 
Analyst 
per 
Firm 
 
Mean 
Firms 
Per 
Analyst
 
Mean  
Analysts 
per 
Employer
 
Mean 
Estimates  
per 
Analyst 
Mean 
Estimates  
per 
Analyst 
per 
Firm  
 
Mean 
Firms 
Per 
Analyst
         
1988 2.45 3.92 2.09 1.90 8.10 8.76 3.07 2.86
1989 3.12 5.32 3.00 1.77 8.40 13.38 3.97 3.38
1990 3.27 7.13 3.80 1.88 8.85 15.13 4.46 3.40
1991 3.78 6.89 3.69 1.87 10.63 15.20 4.52 3.38
1992 3.78 6.33 3.57 1.78 11.14 16.85 4.73 3.57
1993 4.00 7.63 4.36 1.76 11.71 18.70 5.57 3.37
1994 4.36 5.77 3.66 1.58 9.73 10.66 3.87 2.76
1995 4.67 3.57 2.70 1.32 9.45 6.52 2.56 2.57
1996 5.67 3.81 2.84 1.35 13.50 9.02 3.06 2.96
1997 6.71 4.61 3.37 1.37 16.62 10.72 3.52 3.06
1998 6.86 4.96 3.60 1.38 16.68 11.36 3.72 3.05
1999 7.42 4.90 3.63 1.35 16.97 11.49 3.82 3.01
2000 7.95 5.05 3.70 1.36 19.33 11.78 3.96 2.98
2001 8.99 5.32 4.05 1.32 22.35 11.61 4.00 2.90
2002 10.10 5.91 4.54 1.30 26.58 12.41 4.32 2.88
2003 10.44 6.53 5.12 1.28 29.22 13.25 4.74 2.80
2004 11.80 6.65 5.25 1.27 33.81 15.22 5.54 2.75
2005 9.86 7.06 5.79 1.22 29.84 15.12 5.89 2.57
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Panel C: Analysts Characteristics By Country 
 
 
 
 
Country 
Name 
 
 
 
No. 
of 
Firms 
 
 
Distinct 
Employers- 
Underwriters 
 
 
Distinct 
Employers-
Other 
 
 
 
Distinct 
Analysts
 
 
 
 
Estimates 
 
 
Mean  
Analysts 
per Firm 
 
Mean 
Analysts
Forecast
Error 
 
 
Mean 
Analysts 
Recomm.
         
Austria 34 11 58 444 7,496 21.24 0.138 2.5080
Belgium 22 6 52 294 5,842 24.09 0.463 2.4910
Germany 244 30 114 2,505 58,740 29.19 0.114 2.7074
Spain 54 22 96 1,319 29,959 60.28 0.723 2.4133
France 168 27 106 3,023 102,289 50.99 0.115 2.3089
Italy 68 20 102 1,285 19,206 39.35 0.047 2.4259
Netherlands 61 25 118 1,889 42,385 74.18 0.044 2.4752
Switzerland 59 20 100 1,551 50,665 56.56 0.068 2.5300
United 
Kingdom 109 17 108 2,173 53,359 37.41 0.107 2.5230
Denmark 26 8 69 565 13,999 35.46 0.049 2.6262
Finland 40 14 91 751 16,967 41.00 0.109 2.5710
Norway 45 16 65 695 21,170 26.98 0.208 2.5831
Sweden 69 17 85 1,084 32,753 32.58 0.093 2.6181
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Panel D: Broker Class and Recommendations 
 Underwriter Firms Non-Underwriter Firms 
 
 
 
Recommendation 
% of Total  
Recomd’s 
 
No. of 
Recomd’s
No. of 
Firms 
% of Total 
Recomd’s
 
No. of 
Recomd’s 
No. of 
Firms  
       
Strong Buy 0.237 4,138 214 0.211 56,948 733
Buy 0.300 5,232 244 0.294 79,254 763
Hold 0.331 5,768 280 0.331 89,152 803
Sell 0.106 1,854 148 0.109 29,391 642
Strong Sell 0.025 436 53 0.054 14,536 518
   
       
       
 38 
Table II 
Descriptive Statistics – Analyst Recommendations 
 
Table I reports descriptive statistics on employer and analysts characteristics, earnings 
forecasts, and recommendations for the period January 1994 through June 2005 for all 
I/B/E/S reported firms within 13 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United 
Kingdom).  Panel A provides information on analyst recommendations by year and Panel B 
provides information on analyst recommendations by country.   
 
 
Panel A: Recommendations by Year 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Strong 
Buy 
 
 
 
 
Buy 
 
 
 
 
Hold 
 
 
 
 
Sell 
 
 
 
Strong
Sell 
% of 
Strong 
Buys  
to Total 
Recomd
 
 
% of 
Buys  
to Total 
Recomd
 
% of 
Holds  
to Total 
Recomd 
 
 
% of 
Sells  
to Total 
Recomd 
% of 
Strong 
Sells  
to Total 
Recomd
           
1994 411 152 438 49 86 0.362 0.134 0.386 0.043 0.076
1995 785 398 1,022 165 217 0.303 0.154 0.395 0.064 0.084
1996 2,349 1,419 2,997 579 777 0.289 0.175 0.369 0.071 0.096
1997 4,083 2,828 5,354 1,250 1,352 0.275 0.190 0.360 0.084 0.091
1998 5,466 4,553 6,936 1,642 1,518 0.272 0.226 0.345 0.082 0.075
1999 6,362 6,569 7,930 1,972 1,444 0.262 0.271 0.327 0.081 0.059
2000 7,234 8,741 9,499 2,545 1,540 0.245 0.296 0.321 0.086 0.052
2001 7,342 10,448 9,992 2,932 1,323 0.229 0.326 0.312 0.092 0.041
2002 7,313 11,496 11,099 3,775 1,432 0.208 0.327 0.316 0.108 0.041
2003 6,711 11,581 12,092 4,696 1,316 0.184 0.318 0.332 0.129 0.036
2004 6,896 13,374 14,058 5,930 2,042 0.163 0.316 0.332 0.140 0.048
2005 6,003 12,865 13,210 5,491 1,882 0.152 0.326 0.335 0.139 0.048
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Panel B: Recommendations by Country 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
Name 
 
 
 
Strong 
Buy 
 
 
 
 
Buy 
 
 
 
 
Hold 
 
 
 
 
Sell 
 
 
 
Strong
Sell 
% of 
Strong 
Buys  
to Total 
Recomd
 
% of 
Buys  
to Total 
Recomd
 
% of 
Holds  
to Total 
Recomd 
 
% of 
Sells  
to Total 
Recomd
% of 
Strong 
Sells  
to Total 
Recomd
           
Austria 787 863 1,258 303 172 0.233 0.255 0.372 0.090 0.051
Belgium 582 530 1,143 185 76 0.231 0.211 0.454 0.074 0.030
Germany 5,946 8,919 12,844 4,398 2,784 0.170 0.256 0.368 0.126 0.080
Spain 3,851 5,393 5,014 1,868 685 0.229 0.321 0.298 0.111 0.041
France 19,092 23,991 18,336 7,814 2,405 0.267 0.335 0.256 0.109 0.034
Italy 2,079 3,740 3,958 846 306 0.190 0.342 0.362 0.077 0.028
Netherlands 7,653 7,835 13,616 2,151 1,799 0.232 0.237 0.412 0.065 0.054
Switzerland 4,928 8,288 10,014 2,558 1,300 0.182 0.306 0.370 0.094 0.048
United 
Kingdom 5,158 7,274 9,048 2,132 1,685 0.204 0.288 0.358 0.084 0.067
Denmark 1,806 2,317 3,142 1,377 508 0.197 0.253 0.343 0.150 0.056
Finland 2,302 4,783 4,463 2,082 695 0.161 0.334 0.312 0.145 0.049
Norway 2,316 3,692 4,496 1,678 927 0.177 0.282 0.343 0.128 0.071
Sweden 3,900 6,727 7,152 3,604 1,153 0.173 0.299 0.317 0.160 0.051
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Table III 
 
Forecast Error, Recommendations, and Mean Difference  
 
Table II compares the underwriting analyst forecast error (FE) for underwriter stocks to the mean FE for all 
other analysts following the underwriter stocks. This table also compares the mean analyst’s 
recommendation to the mean recommendation for all other analysts following the underwriter stocks. The 
time period January 1988 through June 2005 for all I/B/E/S reported firms within 13 European countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and United Kingdom). Forecast error is the difference between predicted earnings per share 
and the actual earnings per share, scaled by the firms share price. The t-statistics that are reported test for 
differences in the mean forecast errors of analyst-employer class pairs.  N denotes the number of 
observations.  * (**) [***] denotes significance at 1% (5%) and [10%] levels. 
 
 
 
Forecast Error and Recommendations by Underwriting Analysts and Other Analysts  
 
 
 
 
 
IPO and Follow-On 
 
Underwriter 
FE for 
underwriter 
stocks 
(N) 
Other 
analysts FE 
for 
underwriter 
stocks 
 (N) 
 
Underwriter 
Recom’s for 
underwriter 
stocks 
(N) 
Other 
analysts 
Recom’s for 
underwriter 
stocks 
 (N) 
 
 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
      
Underwriter – Other Analysts 0.1513 
(37,813) 
0.1438 
(410,776) 
  0.0075***  
(1.86) 
      
Underwriter Recom’s –Other  
Analysts Recom’s 
  2.3813  
(17,428) 
2.5099 
(189,555) 
-0.1286* 
(15.59) 
      
Type of Financing  
  
(IPO)Underwriter – Other 
Analysts 
0.2067 
(10,725) 
0.1438 
(410,776) 
  0.0629* 
(7.23) 
      
(Follow-On)Underwriter –
Other Analysts 
0.1293 
(27,088) 
0.1438 
(410,776) 
  -0.0145*  
(3.37) 
      
(IPO)Underwriter Recom’s –
Other Analysts Recom’s 
  2.3487  
(5,079) 
2.5099 
(189,555) 
-0.1612* 
(11.52) 
      
(Follow-On) Underwriter 
Recom’s – Other Analysts 
Recom’s 
  2.3948 
(12,349) 
2.5099 
(189,555) 
-0.1151* 
(11.97) 
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Table IV 
 
Forecast Error, Recommendations, and Mean Difference  
 
Table III compares the underwriting analyst forecast error (FE) for underwriter stocks to the FE of all other 
stocks the underwriting analyst follows. This table also compares the underwriting analysts mean 
recommendation to the mean analyst recommendation for all other stocks the underwriter analyst follows. 
The time period January 1988 through June 2005 for all I/B/E/S reported firms within 13 European 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom). Forecast error is the difference between predicted earnings 
per share and the actual earnings per share, scaled by the firms share price. The t-statistics that are 
reported test for differences in the mean forecast errors of analyst-employer class pairs.  N denotes the 
number of observations.  * (**) [***] denotes significance at 1% (5%) and [10%] levels. 
 
 
 
 
Forecast Error and Recommendations by Underwriting Analyst  
 
 
 
 
IPO and Follow-On 
Underwriter 
FE for 
Underwriter 
stocks 
(N) 
 
Underwriter 
FE for all 
other stocks 
(N) 
Underwriter 
Recom’s for 
Underwriter 
stocks 
(N) 
Underwriter 
Recom’s for 
all other 
stocks  
(N) 
 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
      
Underwriter –Other 0.1513 
(37,813) 
0.1196 
(155,499) 
  0.0317* 
(7.57) 
      
Underwriter Recom’s – 
Other Recom’s 
  2.3813 
(17,428) 
2.5236 
(61,314) 
-0.1423* 
(15.82) 
      
Type of Financing  
  
(IPO)Underwriter –Other 0.2067 
(10,725) 
0.1196 
(155,499) 
  0.0871* 
(9.93) 
      
(Follow-On)Underwriter –
Other 
0.1293 
(27,088) 
0.1196 
(155,499) 
  0.0097** 
(2.18) 
      
(IPO)Underwriter Recom’s –
Other Recom’s 
  2.3487  
(5,079) 
2.5236 
(61,314) 
-0.1749* 
(11.40) 
      
(Follow-On)Underwriter 
Recom’s –Other Recom’s 
  2.379 
(12,349) 
2.5236 
(61,314) 
-0.1288* 
(12.55) 
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Table V 
 
Legals Systems, Forecast Error, and Recommendations  
 
Table IV examines analyst forecast error and recommendations according to origin of law. These legal 
jurisdictions are English, French, German, and Scandinavian as suggested by La Porta et al (1998). The 
time period January 1988 through June 2005 for all I/B/E/S reported firms within 13 European countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and United Kingdom). Forecast error is the difference between predicted earnings per share 
and the actual earnings per share, scaled by the firms share price. The t-statistics that are reported test for 
differences in the mean forecast errors of analyst-employer class pairs.  N denotes the number of 
observations.  * (**) [***] denotes significance at 1% (5%) and [10%] levels. 
 
 
 
All Forecast Error and Recommendations for Underwriter Stocks 
 
 
 
 
Origin of Law –  
Underwriter Stocks  
 
FE for all 
Stocks 
followed by 
Underwriter 
(N) 
 
 
Recom’s for all 
Stocks followed 
by Underwriter  
 (N) 
  
 
English Law 
Mean 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
 
 
French Law 
Mean 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
      
English Law  0.0748  
(19,684) 
    
  2.5018  
(5,351) 
   
      
French Law 0.1558  
(80,206) 
  -0.0810* 
(18.37) 
 
      
  2.3417  
(34,611) 
 0.1601* 
(9.93) 
 
      
German Law 0.1010  
(57,509) 
  -0.0262* 
(6.83) 
0.0548* 
(15.34) 
      
  2.6112  
(18,183) 
 -0.1094* 
(6.46) 
-0.2695* 
(28.06) 
      
Scandinavian Law 0.1263  
(35,913) 
  -0.0515* 
(11.32) 
0.0295* 
(6.79) 
      
  2.6373  
(20,597 
 -0.1355* 
(8.11) 
-0.2956* 
(31.16) 
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Table VI 
 
Analysts Forecast Errors and Recommendations By Country 
 
Table IV compares the underwriting analyst mean forecast error (FE) to the mean FE for all 
other analysts following the IPO stocks by country. This table also compares the mean 
analyst’s recommendation to the mean recommendation for all other analysts following the 
IPO stocks by country. The time period January 1988 through June 2005 for all I/B/E/S 
reported firms within 13 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom). 
Forecast error is the difference between predicted earnings per share and the actual earnings 
per share, scaled by the firms share price. The t-statistics that are reported test for 
differences.  N denotes the number of observations.  * (**) [***] denotes significance at 1% 
(5%) and [10%] levels.* (**) [***] denotes significance at 1% (5%) and [10%] levels. 
 
 
 
All Analysts Forecast Error and Recommendations for Underwriter Stocks By Country 
 
 
 
 
Country 
Name 
 
 
Forecast 
Error 
IPO 
 
 
Forecast 
Error 
Other 
Mean 
Difference 
Forecast 
Error 
IPO – 
Other  
(t-stat) 
  
 
Analyst 
Recom. 
IPO 
 
 
Analyst 
Recom. 
Other 
Mean 
Difference 
Recom. 
IPO – Other 
(t-stat) 
        
Austria 0.2413 0.1387 
0.1026    
(3.38)** 2.1771 2.5188 
-0.3417    
(3.03)* 
Belgium 0.2282 0.2403 
-0.0121   
(0.25) 1.9412 2.2622 
-0.3210    
(3.06)* 
Germany 0.3028 0.1012 
0.2016    
(20.82)* 2.6073 2.7343 
-0.1270    
(2.95)* 
Spain 0.8614 0.7820 
0.0794    
(0.90) 2.2426 2.3843 
-0.1417    
(2.30)** 
France 0.2012 0.1213 
0.0799    
(9.01)* 1.9706 2.3413 
-0.3707    
(10.72)* 
Italy 0.0236 0.0196 
0.0040    
(1.72)*** 2.7284 2.5422 
0.1862     
(2.76)* 
Netherlands 0.0657 0.0458 
0.0199    
(3.69)* 1.7936 2.4975 
-0.7039    
(12.15)* 
Switzerland 0.1738 0.0708 
0.1030    
(6.95)* 2.6734 2.4942 
0.1792     
(2.72)* 
United 
Kingdom 0.0835 0.0437 
0.0398    
(2.52)** 1.6087 2.3973 
-0.7886    
(10.08)* 
Denmark 0.0710 0.0581 
0.0129    
(0.55) 2.3045 2.6991 
-0.3946    
(5.46)* 
Finland 0.0670 0.1172 
-0.0502   
(5.43)* 2.5880 2.6168 
-0.0288    
(0.58) 
Norway 0.2845 0.1756 
0.1089    
(2.13)** 2.5877 2.5863 
0.0014     
(0.01) 
Sweden 0.0152 0.0439 
-0.0287   
(2.48)** 2.6810 2.6488 
0.0322     
(0.87) 
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Table VII 
 
Analysts Forecast Errors and Recommendations By Country 
 
Table V compares the underwriting analysts forecast error (FE) to the FE of all other IPO 
stocks the underwriting analyst follows. This table also compares the underwriting analysts 
mean recommendation to the mean analyst recommendation for all other IPO stocks the 
underwriter analyst follows. The time period January 1988 through June 2005 for all I/B/E/S 
reported firms within 13 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom). 
Forecast error is the difference between predicted earnings per share and the actual earnings 
per share, scaled by the firms share price. The t-statistics that are reported test for 
differences.  N denotes the number of observations.  * (**) [***] denotes significance at 1% 
(5%) and [10%] levels.* (**) [***] denotes significance at 1% (5%) and [10%] levels. 
 
 
 
Underwriter Forecast Error and Recommendations for Underwriter Stocks By Country 
 
 
 
 
Country 
Name 
 
 
Forecast 
Error 
IPO 
 
 
Forecast 
Error 
Other 
Mean 
Difference 
Forecast 
Error 
IPO – 
Other  
(t-stat) 
  
 
Analyst 
Recom. 
IPO 
 
 
Analyst 
Recom. 
Other 
Mean 
Difference 
Recom. 
IPO – 
Other  
(t-stat) 
        
Austria 0.2413 0.1720 
0.0693    
(2.04)** 2.1771 2.6117 
-0.4346    
(3.61)* 
Belgium 0.2282 0.2088 
0.0194    
(0.34) 1.9412 2.2073 
-0.2661    
(2.29)** 
Germany 0.3028 0.0968 
0.2060    
(19.29)* 2.6073 2.6764 
-0.0691    
(1.70)*** 
Spain 0.8614 0.4929 
0.3685    
(5.12)* 2.2426 2.3215 
-0.0789    
(1.16) 
France 0.2012 0.1097 
0.0915    
(9.65)* 1.9706 2.3181 
-0.3475    
(10.06)* 
Italy 0.0236 0.0401 
-0.0165   
(1.79)*** 2.7284 2.4779 
0.2505     
(3.57)* 
Netherlands 0.0657 0.0392 
0.0265    
(4.87)* 1.7936 2.5045 
-0.7109    
(12.28)* 
Switzerland 0.1738 0.0685 
0.1053    
(5.95)* 2.6734 2.5777 
0.0957     
(1.49) 
United 
Kingdom 0.0835 0.0759 
0.0076    
(0.29) 1.6087 2.5407 
-0.9320    
(11.12)* 
Denmark 0.0710 0.0574 
0.0136    
(0.56) 2.3045 2.6964 
-0.3919    
(5.31)* 
Finland 0.0670 0.1240 
-0.0570   
(5.27)* 2.5880 2.6658 
-0.0778    
(1.57) 
Norway 0.2845 0.1686 
0.1159    
(2.56)** 2.5877 2.5486 
0.0391     
(0.38) 
Sweden 0.0152 0.0649 
-0.0497   
(4.87)* 2.6810 2.7752 
-0.0942    
(2.34)** 
   
 
 
